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With the revival of global economy, the issues of “exit policies” and rebalancing global 
growth have taken center stage in policy discussions. Since many emerging Asian 
economies presently have large  current account surpluses, the issue of rebalancing has 
special significance for Asia. While India, like other Asian economies, suffered only an 
indirect impact from the financial crisis, its current policy challenges appear to be different 
from those facing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and other East Asian economies, 
which have relied heavily on external demand and access to the US market for their growth 
momentum. With a negative contribution of net exports to gross domestic product growth 
along with foreign exchange reserves, which amount to a mere one-ninth of the PRC’s, the 
issue of Trans-Pacific rebalancing of economic growth does not have the same connotations 
for India as it does for other East Asian economies. However, this paper argues that, given 
its large domestic market, India could help other East Asian economies in their efforts to 
achieve greater export diversification and rebalancing of growth. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
After a year of sharp contraction, advanced economies have shown some signs of 
economic revival. A boom in United States (US) retail sales in late 2009, coupled with 
positive gross domestic product (GDP) growth in Japan, Germany, and France in the 
second half of 2009—and strong growth in the fourth quarter of 2009 and the first quarter 
of 2010 in the US—is indicative of the crisis having bottomed out, and a recovery being 
on its way. These positive developments have provided great relief to policy makers 
across the globe who implemented the largest coordinated fiscal stimulus in history, and 
a liquidity infusion to prevent the recession from becoming a depression. Thankfully, they 
succeeded, despite some concerns that with the tapering off of the stimulus in mid-2010, 
US economic growth could weaken significantly and pull the global economy down with 
it. The possibility of a double-dip recession, stagnating unemployment levels, and fears 
of sovereign defaults in Europe have forced policy makers to consider issues such as 
how and when to roll back the fiscal stimulus and other measures needed to achieve a 
more balanced global economic growth in the future. With an unsettled debate on the 
likely shape of the recovery, the issue of exit policy has recently gained purchase among 
policy discussions in mature economies.
1
Although India, like other Asian economies, suffered only an indirect impact from the 
global  financial crisis, its current  policy  challenges appear to be different from those 
facing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and other East Asian economies, which 
have relied heavily on external demand and access to the US market for their growth 
momentum. With a negative contribution of net exports to GDP growth (see Table 2) 
along with foreign exchange reserves, which are a mere one-ninth of the PRC’s, the 
issue of Trans-pacific  rebalancing of economic  growth  does not have the same 
connotations for India as it might for other East Asian economies. However, given India’s 
large domestic market, India could help other East Asian economies in their efforts to 
achieve greater export diversification and rebalancing of growth. Against this backdrop, 
this paper analyzes the impact of the crisis on India and examines its potential role in 
rebalancing global economic growth. 
 
The paper is divided into eight sections. After summarizing the impact of the crisis on the 
Indian economy and role of the services sector in Section 2, Section 3 discusses the 
nature of India’s policy response to the crisis. Section 4 discusses the likely prospects of 
economic recovery in India, while Section 5 deals with the issues of exit policy. Section 6 
gives a brief outline of the Indian growth model and on that basis examines India’s 
potential role in Trans-Pacific rebalancing (Section 7). Finally, in Section 8, we make 
some policy recommendations for achieving sustainable growth. 
                                                 
 
1  Relying on traditional economic dynamics (a steep downturn producing a sharp rebound), some 
economists, led by Michael Mussa, are  predicting a strong V-shaped recovery. They argue  that 
businesses have cut their workforces far more than the decline in customer demand and are significantly 
understaffed. Therefore,  a  re-employment  process is inevitable and will  be much faster than in past 
recessions. According to these economists, the re-employment process will boost consumer demand, 
and, given its extremely low level, even a small increase in demand would ensure a strong V-shaped 
recovery. This hypothesis has been severely criticized by some renowned economists, including Joseph 
Stiglitz and Nouriel Roubini. Citing the low level of final demand as the principal reason, Roubini (2009) 
has predicted a weak U-shaped recovery. He attributes the recent upturn in assets markets to access 
liquidity that has resulted from the government’s and central banks’ initiatives to arrest the downturn. He 
further warns that if policy makers fail to work out a proper exit policy, the global economy may head 




2.  IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON THE INDIAN ECONOMY 
AND THE ROLE OF THE SERVICES SECTOR 
The Indian economy looked to be relatively insulated from the global financial crisis that 
started in August 2007 when the sub-prime mortgage crisis first surfaced in the US. In 
fact, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) was raising interest rates until August 2008 with 
the explicit objective of bringing down the GDP growth rate, which had visibly moved 
above the rate of potential output growth and was contributing to the build-up of 
inflationary pressures.
2
Fortunately, India, like most of the emerging economies, was lucky to avoid the first 
round  of  adverse  effects because its banks were not overly exposed to sub-prime 
lending. Only one of the larger private sector banks, the ICICI (formerly the Industrial 
Credit and Investment Corporation of India), was partly exposed, but it also managed to 
avoid a crisis because of its strong balance sheet and timely action by the government. 
The banking sector as a  whole  remained financially sound. In  fact, during the third 
quarter of FY2008–2009, which was  a nightmare for many large global  financial 
institutions, banks in India announced encouraging results and witnessed an impressive 
jump in their profitability (Kumar and Vashisht 2009). 
 But when the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 23 September 
2008 morphed the US financial meltdown into a global economic downturn, the impact 
on the Indian economy was almost immediate. The impact of the global crisis on India 
can broadly be divided into two parts: (i) the immediate or direct impact on its financial 
sector and (ii) the indirect impact on economic activities. 
However, the indirect impact or the second round impact of the crisis affected India quite 
significantly. The liquidity squeeze in global markets following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers had serious implications for India: it not only led to massive outflows of foreign 
institutional investment (FII) but also compelled Indian banks and corporations to shift 
their credit demand from external sources to the domestic banking sector. These events 
put  considerable  pressure on liquidity in the domestic market and consequently 
provoked a credit crunch. This credit crunch, coupled with a general loss of confidence, 
increased the risk aversion of Indian banks, which eventually hurt credit expansion in the 
domestic market. 
On the top of that, given the recessionary conditions in many advanced economies, the 
demand for India’s exports in its major markets almost collapsed. Merchandise exports 
shrunk by more than 17% from October 2008 to May 2009. Likewise, exports of services 
also faced a steep downturn. During the third quarter of FY2008–2009, growth in 
services exports declined to a mere 5.9%, as compared to 34% in the corresponding 
period the previous year. Earnings from travel, transportation, insurance, and banking 
services also suffered sharp contractions, while the growth of software exports declined 
by more than 21 percentage points. Yet, the real shock came in the fourth quarter of 
FY2008–2009, when services exports witnessed a contraction of 6.6% as compared to 
the same period a year back (Kumar and Vashisht 2009). This was the first quarterly 
decline in services since the fourth quarter of FY2001–2002. 
                                                 
 
2 Several observers, led by Surjit Bhalla, have been pointing out since May 2008 that inflation, which had 
gone as high as 12.3% at the end of June 2008, was largely imported and a result of global commodity 
price hikes. Therefore, inflation had little to do with India’s own rate of economic growth, which started to 
slow down in the third quarter of FY2007–2008 after reaching the highest level of 10.6% in the second 




The impact of the global crisis on the real economy became even more evident in the 
second half of FY2008–2009, when, contrary to the optimistic official pronouncements, 
the Indian economy registered a modest growth of 5.8%, significantly lower than 9.0% 
achieved in the corresponding period in FY2007–2008, and after having achieved a GDP 
growth of 7.8% in the first half of FY2008–2009. However, this slump in the GDP growth 
rate was much lower when compared to the decline in GDP growth rate of several East 
Asian economies (see Table 1). Apart from the low trade-to-GDP ratios and a negative 
contribution of net exports to GDP growth (see Table 2), the relative importance of 
services, both in terms of their contribution to GDP and trade (see Table 3), 
differentiated India from most East Asian economies. It could be argued that since a 
large number of services are of a non-tradable nature, they are less vulnerable to an 
external crisis. Moreover, even in the case of tradable services, the impact of external 
shocks is expected to be relatively low as the demand for traded services is less cyclical 
(because they are not storable) and their production is less dependent on external 
finance (Borchert 2009). This hypothesis was well corroborated by the performance of 
India’s service sector during the recent crisis, when India showed a remarkable 
resilience and maintained a growth rate of more than 8% (see Figure 1), which, though 
historically low by India's standards, was still fairly robust. 
Table 1: Year-on-Year Quarterly GDP Growth Rates (%) 
   2008  2009 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3 
India  8.6  7.8  7.7  5.8  5.8  6.1  7.9 
People’s Republic of China  10.6  10.1  9  6.8  6.1  7.9  8.9 
Republic of Korea  1.1  0.4  0.2  -5.1  0.1  2.6  3.2 
Singapore  6.66  2.51  0.04  -4.23  -9.51  -3.31  0.56 
Thailand  5.97  5.28  3.90  -4.20  -6.73  -4.94  -3.51 
Philippines  3.66  4.84  4.19  1.84  0.59  0.77  0.76 
Malaysia  7.41  6.56  4.77  0.13  -6.25  -3.94  -1.25 
Indonesia  6.25  6.42  6.40  5.18  4.45  4.04  4.21 
Source: Central Statistics Office (2009–2010), National Bureau of Statistics, PRC; Central Bank of Korea 
(2009); and ASEAN Finance and Macro-economic Surveillance Unit Database 
(http://www.aseansec.org/18135.htm [accessed on 18 February 2010]). 
However, similar resilience was not observed in some East Asian economies—such as 
Japan, Singapore, the Republic of Korea (hereafter “Korea”), and the Philippines—where 
the services sector has an equal or even larger share of GDP. One possible explanation 
could lie in the different composition of the services sectors in these countries. Due to 
the higher level of merchandise trade, the services sectors in the abovementioned 
economies have largely been dominated by foreign trade-related services, such as 
trade, transportation, storage, and other trade-related financial services, such as foreign 
trade financing and insurance. For example, in Singapore, where merchandise trade is 
as high as 386% of GDP (see Table 3), trade-related services account for more than 
75% of total value added in services sector (see Table 4). With this high dependence of 
services on merchandise trade, the sector suffered along with merchandise trade in the 




In contrast, the dependence of services sector on foreign trade-related services in India 
is much lower, at around 62%.
3
Just as in other emerging economies, manufacturing bore the real brunt of the crisis in 
India. In the wake of a decline in domestic and export demand, the manufacturing sector 
witnessed a contraction of 0.25% in the second half of FY2008–09, while growth in 
mining and quarrying slowed from 4.15% to 3.25%. 
 A disaggregated analysis of services sector growth 
shows that this lower dependence on merchandise trade has been critical in maintaining 
growth. As anticipated, trade-related services registered a significant decline during the 
period of crisis, while other services—including community, social, and personal services 
(17.5%), and financial, real estate, and business services (8.9%)—continued to grow at 
a healthy rate (see Table 5). 
Table 2: Composition of GDP Growth (%) 
 
 
People’s Republic of 
China (PRC)  India 
1995–2000  2000–2007  1996–2001  2001–2007 
Final consumption expenditure  66.1  38.3  76.9  53.2 
Gross capital formation  27.1  48.3  20.4  57.3 
Net exports  6.8  13.4  2.7  -10.5 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Authors’ compilation from CSO (2009) and NBS (2008). 
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Source: CSO (2009-10). 
                                                 
 
3 Here, it should be noted that the financial and business services also include software and business 
process outsourcing (BPO) services, which are not related to merchandise trade. In India, these services 
have grown rapidly.  If we remove these services (which could not be done due to the lack of 




Table 3: Composition of GDP and Outward Orientation 
  
  
Composition of GDP (2006)  Trade % of 
GDP 
Merchandise 
Trade % of GDP 
Services Trade 
% of GDP  Agri  Industry  Services 
PRC  11.71  48.37  39.91  72.39  66.56  5.83 
India  17.53  27.89  54.58  48.78  32.36  16.41 
Japan  1.50  29.90  68.60  ---  ---  --- 
Indonesia  12.90  47.05  40.06  56.90  50.40  6.50 
Republic of Korea  3.25  39.60  57.15  85.35  71.49  13.86 
Malaysia  8.71  49.94  41.35  216.98  193.68  23.30 
Philippines  14.18  31.63  54.19  94.01  83.84  10.18 
Singapore  0.09  34.74  65.17  473.51  386.22  87.29 
Thailand  10.70  44.62  44.68  143.53  125.73  17.80 
Source: World Development Indicators 2008 (file://localhost/Softarchives/WDI-2008/Tables/wdi2008home.html [accessed 5 February 2010]). 
 
Table 4: Composition of Services Sector (%) 
   Singapore  India 
Trade, Transportation & Storage  41.25  37.26 
Hotels & Restaurants  2.90  2.79 
Information & Communications  6.03  10.14 
Financial & Business  34.19  26.23 
Other  15.63  23.58 
Source: Authors’ compilation from CSO (2009) and Singapore Department of Statistics (http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/themes/economy/natac.html [accessed 5 February 




Table 5: Quarterly Estimates of GDP Growth (%) 
   2007-2008  2008-2009  2009-10 
   1st Half  2nd Half  Annual  1st Half  2nd Half  Annual  1st Half 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing  4.1  5.15  4.9  2.85  0.95  1.6  1.65 
Mining and quarrying  1.95  4.45  3.3  4.15  3.25  3.6  8.7 
Manufacturing  9.1  7.45  8.2  5.3  -0.25  2.4  6.3 
Electricity, gas, and water supply  6.4  4.2  5.3  3.25  3.55  3.4  6.8 
Construction  12.2  8.3  10.1  9  5.5  7.2  6.8 
Trade, hotel, transport, and communication*  12  12.75  12.4  12.55  6.1  9  8.3 
Finance, real estate, and business services  12.5  11.1  11.7  6.65  8.9  7.8  8.25 
Community, social, and personal services  5.8  7.5  6.8  8.6  17.5  13.1  9.75 
GDP  9.1  9.0  9.0  7.8  5.8  6.7  7.0 
Source: CSO (2009-10). 
* It should be noted that during the period of crisis, the communication sector continued to grow at a reasonable rate. This was the period when the number of mobile phone 
subscribers was growing at a reasonably high rate. Therefore, the real slump was in trade and transportation services. 





3.  POLICY RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS 
3.1  Fiscal Stimulus 
The Indian economy received a major fiscal stimulus as early as February 2008, when an 
election-oriented budget for FY2008–2009 was announced. The electoral cycle, often 
criticized for its deleterious effects on reforms and economic performance, on this occasion 
helped India to anticipate the global crisis and take advance action. The budget included 
massive increases in public outlays in support of employment guarantee schemes, farm loan 
waivers, pay hikes to government employees, and increases in food and fertilizer subsidies 
(Kumar and Vashisht 2009). This pre-election fiscal splurge resulted in the revenue deficit 
increasing from 1.1% of the GDP in FY2007–2008 to 4.5% in FY2008–2009. Yet, it also 
ensured that domestic aggregate demand did not slacken in the aftermath of the Lehman 
meltdown;  compensated for the collapse in external demand;  and,  as described above, 
helped sustained overall GDP growth at a reasonable 5.8%. Having inadvertently anticipated 
the crisis due to the electoral cycle, the government found that it did not have much fiscal 
space to take any further steps to counter the impact of the global downturn. 
However, some fiscal stimulus was still provided, primarily as a response to the global call 
for coordinated action by the G-20 Summits. Three fiscal stimuli packages—one in 
December 2008, after the Washington, DC, G-20 Summit, and one each in January and 
March 2010, just preceding the London Summit—were  announced. These stimulus 
packages were in large measure focused on optics,  as they included the full value of 
staggered outlays on infrastructure, reduction in indirect taxes, and some assistance for 
export-oriented industries. To boost spending on infrastructure, clearly the most desirable 
modality for delivering the fiscal stimulus,  the Indian government announced an increase in 
planned spending by US$4 billion and also allowed the state governments an additional 
US$6 billion in market borrowing. Apart from this, the India Infrastructure Finance Company, 
Limited (IIFCL), established in 2007, was allowed to issue interest-free bonds worth US$6 
billion for refinancing long-term loans for infrastructure projects. 
A real push for demand came from a rate reduction in central excise duties from 14% to 8% 
and a lowering of the services tax rate from 12% to 10%. Exporters were given relief by 
reducing their interest costs by up to 2%, subject to a minimum rate of 7% per annum. 
Another US$240 million was allocated for a full refund of terminal excise duty or central 
sales tax, wherever applicable, and US$80 million for beefing up various export incentives 
schemes. In aggregate, the fiscal stimulus, under all three packages, came to about 2% of 
total GDP. This figure looks rather small in comparison to the size of the stimulus in some 
other economies, such as the PRC or the US. However, if we include the stimulus provided 
in the FY2008–2009 budget, the size of the fiscal stimulus in FY2008–2009 can be 
estimated at around 6% of GDP, comparable to the efforts made by other governments. 
3.2  Monetary Policy Response 
Joining the global trend, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has, since October 2008, injected 
considerable liquidity into the economy through a series of policy rate cuts. The cash reserve 
ratio (CRR)  was brought down from 9% to 5%, and the repo rate by 425 basis points. 
Further, in order to discourage banks from parking overnight funds with the RBI, the reverse 
repo rate was reduced from 6.0% in November 2008 to 3.25% in April 2009 (see Figure 2). 
The statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) was also lowered by one percentage point from 25% to 
24%. Apart from this, some special refinancing schemes were  announced to improve 
liquidity for certain sectors (Kumar and Vashisht 2009). The CRR reduction of 400 basis 
points since September 2008 alone resulted in a liquidity injection of US$32.7 billion. In 
addition, another sum of US$12.9 billion was injected by unwinding the market stabilization 





































































































































































































Reverse repo rate Repo rate Cash Reserve Ratio
 
Source: Reserve Bank of India (2009-2010). 
As a result of these policy rate cuts, the prime lending rates of commercial banks came 
down from 13.75–14.0% in October 2008 to 12.0–12.5% in January 2009. They softened 
further during 2009 as the demand for commercial bank credit fell due to the slowdown in 
growth. Several banks ended up with huge liquidity overhangs and parked liquid funds with 
the RBI in overnight deposits that earned them low returns of 3–3.5% depending on the 
reverse repo rate at the time. The call money rates have also remained stable at low levels 
and the overnight money market rate has remained within the liquidity adjustment-facility 
corridor.
4
RBI also liberalized the external commercial borrowings (ECBs) and FII-related norms to 
attract foreign capital. The FII limit on corporate bonds was increased from US$6 billion to 
US$15 billion. At the same time, real estate developers were permitted to raise ECBs for 
integrated townships  projects, while non-banking financial companies (NBFCs)  dealing 
exclusively with infrastructure financing were allowed to access ECBs from either multilateral 
or bilateral financial institutions.  
 
The three fiscal stimuli and monetary policy measures reinforced the significant fiscal 
expansion undertaken in the FY2008–2009 budget. However, in hindsight, it is clear that the 
fiscal measures which effectively transferred substantial purchasing power to the rural sector 
were more effective in shoring up aggregate demand than monetary policy measures, whose 
traction  has been evidently weak—perhaps because of underutilized capacities and the 
uncertain external demand conditions, both of which kept investment demand rather 
subdued until September 2009, when demand began to rise as reflected in the upturn in 
capital goods imports and growth in commercial bank credit. The expansionary budget of 
February 2008, together with subsequent policy measures, ensured that the downturn in 
GDP growth was not as steep as some of the advanced and major emerging economies, 
ultimately suggesting that the economy could be brought back to its potential growth path in 
the short term. 
4.  SHORT-TERM GROWTH OUTLOOK 
The Indian economy recovered fairly quickly from the downturn that saw the GDP growth 
slump to 5.8% in both the third quarter of FY2008–20009 (October to December 2009) and 
                                                 
 
4 With the economy picking up in the second half of 2009, the situation began to change and the non-food credit 





the fourth quarter of FY2009–2010 (January to March 2009; see Table 5 above). It achieved 
6.1% growth in the next quarter and was growing at 7.9% in the second quarter of FY2009–
2010. This was in line with global trends and clearly a result of the expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policy measures taken in the wake of the global recession. The government's 
(CSO’s)  advanced  estimate for economic growth for FY2009–2010 (April 2009 to March 
2010) was 7.2%. The growth momentum is likely to continue in the current year (FY2010–
2011) as well, with both the government and the RBI now estimating GDP growth in 
FY2010–2011 to be around 8%. The key question is whether GDP growth can be 
maintained in the face of strong prevailing inflationary pressures, and without a further 
worsening of the fiscal and current account deficits. 
We have made our own forecasts for the non-agriculture sector GDP growth in FY2010–
2011 on the basis of an index of leading economic indicators (LEIs).
5 Using the leading 
economic indicator index to forecast GDP growth, we found that the LEI with a five-quarter 
lag explains the variation in non-agricultural GDP growth most precisely.
6
GRNon-agriGDPt = 8.72 + 1.54 LEIt-5   - 3.13 Dummy 
 However, since 
the selected leading indicators do not capture the impact of external shocks such as the 
information technology (IT)  boom-bust in FY2000–2001  and the recent US financial 
meltdown, both of which directly and indirectly impacted the Indian economy, we used a 
dummy variable to capture their impact. The LEI with a five-quarter lag and the shock 
represented by a dummy variable (equal to “1”  with shock and “0” without) are used to 
forecast India’s non-agricultural GDP growth. The estimated equation for forecasting non-
agriculture GDP (given below) is satisfactory with an adjusted r-squared value of 0.55 and all 
the coefficients being statistically significant at a 99% confidence level. 
        (5.67)       (-5.72) 
Based on this model, the LEIs suggest that perhaps the Indian economy bottomed out in the 
first quarter of FY2009–2010 and economic activity is on the upturn. According to this model, 
the non-agricultural GDP will grow by 8.3% in FY2009–2010, while it will rise by 8.7% in 
FY2010–2011  (see Figure 3). Thus,  the recovery  seems to be well underway. And if 
macroeconomic stability can be achieved in India, the economy could be on its potential 
growth trajectory by FY2011–2012. 
                                                 
 
5 Leading economic indicators (LEI) are variables that are considered to have significant influence on the future 
level of economic activity in the country. These indicators give advance signals about the likely future growth 
rate. Generally, they are used to identify inflection points in the business cycles which can be done with some 
accuracy as the change in direction of the principal leading indicators would result in a similar directional 
change in the overall economic activity. The predictive quality of these indicators has given them the 
appellation of being “leading” indicators. For constructing the leading indicators index, the following nine 
indicators have been selected, after testing their correlation with and predictive quality for overall economic 
activity: (i) production of machinery and equipment, (ii) non-food credit, (iii) railway freight traffic; (iv) cement 
sales, (v) net sales of the corporate sector, (vi) fuel and metal prices, (vii) real rate of interest, (viii) the BSE 
Sensex, and (ix) export growth. A composite index has been constructed for the period 1997–2008 with the 
quarterly series of growth of these variables (except for the real rate of interest, where the level, and not the 
growth, has been used) using the “principal component index” (PCI) method. 
6 We have been using the leading economic indicator (LEI) index for GDP forecasting for three years. Using LEI 
methodology, for example, we predicted a growth of GDP at 9.2% for 2007–2008 in November 2007. Most 
other agencies had predicted a lower growth rate of 8.5% or below for that year as against the actual growth 





Figure 3: Actual and Forecasted Quarterly Non-Agricultural GDP Growth 
 
Source: CSO (2009) and authors’ own estimates. 
The economic downturn lasted for two years, FY2008–2009 and FY2009–2010, when the 
GDP growth came down to 6.7% and 7.2% respectively from the average rate of 9% 
achieved in the previous five years. The slowdown in FY2008–2009, as discussed earlier, 
was partially a result of policy tightening (until August 2008), and partially due to the second-
round effects of the global recession. Recovery in FY2009–2010 was hampered by the 
monsoon, which affected the main khariff (winter) crop and is expected to bring down the 
rate of growth of agriculture GDP to about negative 2–4%. On the basis of their estimate for 
agriculture growth, Mathew et al. (2009) forecast the FY2009–2010 GDP growth at 6.8%. 
Other development organizations—the IMF, World Bank (2010), and the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB, 2009), among others—have also estimated Indian GDP growth in FY2009–2010 
at similar levels (7.0%) in their latest forecasts. 
With  stronger industry growth being indicated for FY2010–2011 and a better external 
environment, we might expect higher GDP growth in FY2010–2011. According to our LEI, 
non-agriculture sector GDP growth for FY2010–2011 is likely to be 8.7%. From all accounts, 
monsoons are expected to be normal this year. With the advantage of a low base and a 
normal monsoon season, agricultural growth in FY2010–2011 is expected to be about 4%. 
This will yield an overall GDP growth rate of nearly 8% for FY2010–2011—an estimate 
similar to that made recently by the RBI (RBI 2010). 
There are three potential risks to this growth forecast for FY2010–2011. The first is the 
continuing inflationary pressure in the economy, with the wholesale price index (WPI) rising 
to 9.9% by the end of March 2010 and expected to remain in double digits until October 
2010. Although it is expected to decline to between 5–6% by March 2011, that expectation is 
premised upon a normal monsoon season, stability in global commodity and oil prices, and 
significant improvement in food availability. Moreover, even if the reduction in fiscal deficit as 
announced in the FY2010–2011 budget is achieved, the government's borrowing program 
still remains very large and has to be financed almost fully by issuance of new securities, 
which will require the RBI to keep the liquidity at comfortable levels if the market interest 
rates are not to shoot up. This will also add to inflationary pressures. 
Second, FY2009–2010 is expected to end with an external sector imbalance reminiscent of 
the crisis years of 1990–1991, when the country faced an external payments default. The 
current account deficit is expected to be nearly 4% of GDP in FY2009–2010 as compared to 
only 2.4% in the previous year and 3.1% in 1990–1991. This may also prompt the RBI to 
raise interest rates in an effort to dampen investment demand, and slow the rise in imports, 
which increased by 66% in February 2010—pushed up to a large extent by capital goods 





rate due to higher capital inflows, which may further worsen the current account deficit. An 
appreciating rupee also means that the economy may not be able to benefit from an 
increase in export demand. Finally, the global economic recovery, it is argued, could falter as 
the expansionary effects of the fiscal stimulus begin to wear off mid-year. This could mitigate 
the US rebound and, in the event the Euro Area and Japan experience a sluggish recovery, 
further dampen external demand. Overall, therefore, we tend to believe that the 8% GDP 
growth has a downward bias rather than an upward one as stated by the RBI in its recent 
macroeconomic policy review (RBI 2010). 
5.  ASSESSMENT OF THE POLICY RESPONSES AND 
ISSUES OF EXIT POLICY 
The Indian fiscal policy response to the crisis can best be summarized as having been 
preempted by political considerations. This resulted in a fiscal expansion ahead of the global 
crisis. While clearly inadvertent, it proved to be master stroke, as it effectively anticipated the 
crisis and prevented the collapse of domestic and specifically rural demand at a time when 
external demand had virtually disappeared. But with the combined fiscal deficit of the Center 
and States (the federal government and the regional or provincial governments) reaching 
8.5% of GDP, it left only limited fiscal space to respond in the aftermath of the crisis. This is 
reflected in the size of the post-December 2008 fiscal stimulus packages. Being smaller than 
expected, the burden fell largely on monetary policy.
7 The post-crisis fiscal stimulus, though 
small in size as compared to other countries’, worsened the fiscal deficit, increasing it to 
9.7%  of GDP in  FY2009–2010  (see Table 6).    This implied  a significant increase in 
government borrowing, which increased from Rs126,912 crore (US$25.3 billion) in FY2007–
2008 to Rs284,396 crore (US$63.1 billion) in FY2008–2009, and further to Rs419,622 crore 
(US$93.1 billion) in FY2009–2010. This raised the debt-to-GDP ratio from 71.6% to 73.2% in 
2009–10. Debt servicing, which accounted for about 50.8% of total revenue receipts in 
FY2008–2009 went up to 54.5% in FY2009–2010 and is expected to be around 56% in 
FY2010–2011. The rise in fiscal deficit could have engendered a significant downgrading of 
India’s sovereign credit.
8
Table 6: Key Fiscal Indicators as Percentage of GDP 
 However, the risk of the downgrade has for the time being been 
averted by the government's commitment, as announced in the most recent union budget, to 
bring down the fiscal deficit in FY2010–2011 by 1.2 percentage points from 6.7% of GDP in 
FY2009–2010 to 5.5% of GDP in FY2010–2011. 




  Center  State  Combined  Center  State  Combined 
2007-2008  2.5  1.5  4.1  57.3  26.8  72.0 
2008-2009   6.0  2.6  8.5  65..7  26.2  71.6 
2009-2010 (RE)  6.7  3.2  9.7  57.0  26.5  73.2 
2010-2011 (BE)  5.5  ---  ---  56.9  ---  --- 
Source: RBI (2010) 
Note: RE stands for revised estimates and BE stands for budget estimates. 
                                                 
 
7 It is argued by some observers that the policy response was delayed because the government was initially in a 
state of denial, believing that the global crisis would not affect the Indian economy since its banking sector was 
not at all affected. It was argued that the net contribution of trade-to-GDP growth is negative and hence the 
turmoil in the global market would not have any major impact on India. However, a sharp deterioration in some 
key sectors soon changed this perception and the government's policy response started in December 2008. 
8 Due to the deteriorating fiscal position, leading credit rating agencies like Standard & Poors (S&P) and Moody’s 





In contrast to the constrained fiscal policy response, the monetary policy response was more 
robust and aggressive,  as the authorities had significant policy space created by the 
monetary policy tightening undertaken since October 2005. The RBI brought down the repo 
and reverse repo rates by 4.25% and 2.75% points, respectively, between October 2008 and 
April 2009, and reduced the CRR by 4 percentage points. However, the sharp increase in 
government borrowings to finance the high fiscal deficit has generated an upward pressure 
on market interest rates. This is also reflected in the 10-year bond yield rate going up along 
with the announcement of the new stimulus package  (Kumar and Vashisht 2009). The 
monetary policy’s traction has been limited not only because of the government’s large 
borrowing requirement, which  has kept market interest high,  but also because of the 
fragmented domestic credit markets and a large part of the economy still operating outside 
the formal banking system. As a result, policy rate cuts have not filtered into the retail credit 
market, with commercial bank lending rates coming down by only about 200 basis points 
despite the RBI having slashed its repo rate by as much as 450 basis points. Consequently, 
the growth in non-food credit, a leading and significant indicator of investment demand, 
remained significantly below past trends—at least until the last quarter of FY2009–2010, 
when it picked up to reach almost to the same level as in FY2008–2009 (16.9% as 
compared to 17.3%), but still noticeably lower than 22% growth in FY2007–2008. In the 
Indian context, where there is apparently a relatively high structural floor to fiscal deficit, and 
where monetary policy has limited traction, macroeconomic policy measures can be 
expected to have a somewhat limited impact on sustaining rapid growth along with 
macroeconomic stability. Unlike the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which has been able 
to achieve both rapid growth and stable prices, India seems to run rapidly into the trade-off 
between rapid growth and macroeconomic stability. Thus, cyclical upswings are fairly short-
lived. The longest upswing during FY2003–2004 to FY2007–2008 was largely a result of the 
most benign and expansionary global economic conditions. For the future, India must focus 
on completing its program of structural economic reforms to sustain rapid and inclusive 
growth along with macroeconomic stability. 
6.  ASIAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND INDIA’S 
POTENTIAL ROLE 
The economic rise of Asia is one of the most noticeable facts of last few decades. First, the 
impressive growth of East Asian economies—mainly the so-called East Asian tigers in late 
1960s  and  1970s,
9
                                                 
 
9 The success of the Asian tigers not only highlighted Asia on global map but also brought a radical change in 
economic policies worldwide. Until 1965, structural schools of thought, which put great emphasis on import 
protection, dominated policy circles. However, since the success of East Asian economies was based on an 
open economy model, it gave a great boost to the neoclassical schools of thought. 
 and the phenomenal  rise of the People’s Republic of China  (PRC), 
followed more recently by India—has ensured Asia’s emergence as perhaps the principal 
engine of global growth. Noticeably, all successful Asian economies, excluding India, used 
an export-oriented growth model, which, while generating higher growth rates for these 
economies, also increased their dependence on access to advanced economy markets for 
absorbing these exports, in turn making them more vulnerable to any negative development 
in these economies. Figure 4, which shows the current global trade and production networks 
in Asia, clearly shows that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has emerged as the major 
production hub within Asia, with the ASEAN economies providing the necessary 
intermediate inputs and components and the Euro Area and North America representing the 
major markets for the final products. These two major markets absorbed nearly US$1.03 
trillion worth of exports from this East and Southeast Asian production system just prior to 
the Lehman crisis—about 33% of the total exports from the PRC and the ASEAN 





demonstrated rather spectacularly in the post-Lehman period. The need to reduce the 
region's dependence on external demand and achieve more balanced growth has become 
evident. The rather sharp recoveries in the PRC and in other Asian economies in 2009 
suggest that efforts to raise the share of indigenous demand in sustaining the region's 
growth may already be yielding the desired results. This process of reducing Asia's 
dependence on external markets can be further strengthened with the expansion of the 
production networks and markets beyond East and Southeast Asia to South Asia. 
Figure 4: Global Trade Map 
 
Source: Reproduced from Hiratsuka (2008). 
Given its potentially large domestic market, ample supply of skilled labor at relatively low 
wages, and dynamic entrepreneurial class, India can play an important role in the 
rebalancing of Asia-Pacific economic growth in future. Until recently, India’s interaction and 
integration with the South and East Asian economies has not been substantial. However, 
this changed with the launching of India's “Look East Policy” in 1992, with the avowed goal 
of achieving far greater integration with its dynamic neighbors in Southeast and East Asia. 
Major initiatives included a free trade agreement (FTA) with Thailand, a comprehensive 
economic partnership agreement with Singapore and Korea, and a recently concluded FTA 
between India and ASEAN, which, for the time being, is limited only to goods. The positive 
outcome of these initiatives is reflected in a sharp increase in bilateral trade between India 
and the PRC and ASEAN  economies (see Table 7). However, somewhat paradoxically, 
India’s trade has increased most rapidly with the PRC, which does not have any trade 
agreement with India. The two-way trade between India and the PRC went up from US$2.7 





US$6.7 billion to US$39.6 billion during same period. Within ASEAN, India’s trade has 
increased substantially with Singapore and Thailand, which have signed trade pacts with 
India (see Table 8). Similarly, India’s trade with the eight countries of the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Japan, and Korea has also increased, 
though at lower rates. India is increasingly becoming integrated with Asia, which has 
emerged as its major trade partner, replacing the erstwhile dominant role of the US and 
Europe in India's external linkages. 
However, despite the recent growth, India’s current trade with the abovementioned 
economies is far below potential. In an empirical investigation, De (2009) found that India’s 
trade with the PRC, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Viet Nam, and Myanmar is 5–
15% lower than its potential, while for the Philippines, Brunei, Cambodia, the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Bangladesh, and Pakistan, the gap between actual and 
potential trade is much higher, ranging from 53% to 93%. Thus, there is sufficient scope for 
India to continue with its efforts to integrate more closely with its Asian partners. 
In line with growing trade, India’s investment relations with Asia have also recently improved. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) from Asia to India, which was just US$304 million in 2004, 
increased to US$6.15 billion in 2009 (see Table 9), registering an annual compound growth 
rate of 87%. Likewise, FDI from India to Asia has also increased from US$461.4 million in 
2004 to US$5.99 billion in 2008, thereby increasing Asia’s share in total Indian outbound FDI 
from 16.46% to 27.1% during the same period. 
Table 7: India’s Two-way Trade with Selected Asian Economies (US$ billion) 
  
  
ASEAN  SAARC  PRC  Japan  Korea 
Value  Share  Value  Share  Value  Share  Value  Share  Value  Share 
2001  6.7  7.5  2.7  3.0  2.8  3.1  3.3  3.7  1.6  1.8 
2002  8.0  7.7  2.9  2.8  4.2  4.0  3.9  3.8  1.9  1.8 
2003  9.9  7.8  4.5  3.6  6.2  4.9  4.0  3.2  3.1  2.4 
2004  13.6  8.2  5.5  3.3  10.1  6.1  4.8  2.9  4.3  2.6 
2005  17.9  7.8  6.8  3.0  17.3  7.6  6.1  2.7  5.9  2.6 
2006  25.1  8.8  7.7  2.7  23.5  8.2  7.5  2.6  7.2  2.5 
2007  30.0  8.6  9.6  2.8  34.0  9.8  9.0  2.6  7.9  2.3 
2008  39.7  8.3  12.3  2.6  41.7  8.7  11.4  2.4  12.1  2.5 
Source: UNComtrade database (http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx [accessed on 10 February 2010]). 
Table 8: Share of ASEAN countries in India’s Trade in 2008 (%) 
 Year  Exports  Imports 
Brunei  0.1  1.2 
Cambodia  0.3  0.0 
Indonesia   13.7  24.1 
Lao PDR  0.0  0.0 
Myanmar  15.6  28.0 
Malaysia  1.2  0.9 
Philippines  3.9  0.9 
Singapore  45.6  31.1 
Thailand  10.3  10.0 
Viet Nam  9.3  1.4 













Value  Share  Value  Share 
2004  304.8  8.00  461.4  16.46 
2005  655.1  14.97  535.0  18.71 
2006  1,146.2  10.3  1,855.1  12.3 
2007  2,548.3  13.2  9,944.6  43.1 
2008  5,097.0  15.8  5,993.6  27.1 
2009  6,150.4  20.2  ---  --- 
Source: Authors’ compilation from Ministry of Commerce (2007, 2010) and Ministry of Finance 
(http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_eco_affairs/icsection/Annexure_5.html [accessed: 1 April 2010]). 
7.  INDIA: A DIFFERENT GROWTH MODEL 
India has recently emerged as one of fastest growing Asian economies, but with a growth 
model that is quite distinct from the export-oriented strategy adopted by other rapidly 
growing Asian economies. While all East Asian economies have derived a predominant part 
of their growth from external sources, both in terms of foreign capital and export market, 
India’s growth has mostly come from its internal sources. This is shown rather dramatically 
by comparing the contribution of net exports to GDP growth in the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) and India (see Table 2). India has managed to grow at reasonably high rates 
despite consistently generating a large trade deficit, which has been made up principally by 
the surplus on the invisibles account (see Table 10). This highlights the role that services 
exports, principally software exports, have played in maintaining an external sector balance 
for India and in sustaining high GDP growth rates as well. 
Table 10: India’s Balance of Payments (US$ million) 
  2006-2007  2007-2008  2008-2009 
Exports  128,888  166,162  189,001 
Imports  190,670  257,629  307,651 
Trade balance  -61,782  -91,467  -118,650 
% of GDP  -6.5  -7.4  -9.8 
Invisible receipts  114,558  148,875  163,534 
Invisible payments  62,341  73,144  73,612 
Invisibles, net  52,217  75,731  89,922 
% of GDP  5.5  6.2  7.4 
Current account  -9,565  -15,736  -28,728 
% of GDP  -1.0  -1.3  -2.4 
Capital account (net)  46,171  107,901  8,648 
% of GDP  4.9  8.8  0.7 
Foreign direct investment (FDI)  7,693  15,893  17,498 
Portfolio investment  7,060  27,433  -14,030 
External commercial borrowings  16,103  22,609  7,941 
Short-term trade credit  6,612  15,930  -1,909 
External assistance  1,775  2,114  2,637 
NRI deposits  4,321  179  4,290 
Other banking capital  -2,408  11,580  -7,535 
Other flows  5,015  12,163  -244 
Change in Reserves (-increase; +decline)  -36,606  -92,165  20,080 





The overall current account deficit has been managed at fairly low levels, ranging from 
between 1.5% to 2.5% of GDP, except in certain years. This implies that the domestic 
savings-investment gap has been kept at low levels, and that India has managed to finance 
a predominant part of its capital formation from domestic savings (see Figure 6). At the same 
time, unlike the PRC, it has also not generated excessive savings, which, despite their 
exceptionally high levels, have not been absorbed in domestic investment, and have to be 
exported, as revealed in the persistent current account surplus in the PRC. 
Taken together, a small current account deficit and only a modest level of foreign exchange 
reserves had until recently (2002) implied a rather limited inflow of foreign capital into India. 
As Table 11 shows, foreign capital inflows, both portfolio and direct equity varieties, ranged 
from between US$103 million to US$6.79 trillion between 1991 and 2001. These were hardly 
a fraction of the FDI and portfolios that the PRC managed to attract during the same period. 
However, this changed significantly in 2003, when the combined FDI and portfolio capital 
inflows jumped up to US$15.7 trillion and marked the beginning of an upward trend. Given 
the low current account deficit during these years (and a very small surplus in 2002–03), 
these enhanced capital inflows have enabled India to build up sizable foreign exchange 
reserves, As shown in Table 11, these are now US$279.1 trillion at the end of FY2009–
2010, a level which is still only a fifth of the PRC’s reserves but which affords India ample 
insurance against external shocks. This is evident by recognizing that India's reserves 
represent 121% of its total foreign debt and 73% of its total annual current account liabilities. 
Table 11: India’s Foreign Capital Inflows and Foreign Exchange Reserves 
(US$ million) 




Total (I+II)  Foreign Exchange 
Reserves 
1990-91     97  6  103  5,834 
1991-92     129  4  133  9,220 
1992-93     315  244  559  9,832 
1993-94     586  3,567  4,153  19,254 
1994-95     1,314  3,824  5,138  25,186 
1995-96     2,144  2,748  4,892  21,687 
1996-97     2,821  3,312  6,133  26,423 
1997-98     3,557  1,828  5,385  29,367 
1998-99     2,462  -61  2,401  32,490 
1999-00     2,155  3,026  5,181  38,036 
2000-01     4,029  2,760  6,789  42,281 
2001-02     6,130  2,021  8,151  54,106 
2002-03     5,035  979  6,014  76,100 
2003-04     4,322  11,377  15,699  112,959 
2004-05     6,051  9,315  15,366  141,514 
2005-06     8,961  12,492  21,453  151,622 
2006-07     22,826  7,003  29,829  199,179 
2007-08     34,362  27,271  61,633  309,723 
2008-09     35,168  -13,855  21,313  251,985 
2009-10  ---  ---    279,096 
Source: RBI (2009a) and Weekly Statistical Supplements (http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ViewWSSExtract.aspx 
[accessed 10 February 2010]). 
There has been a major debate about the beginning of India's high growth trajectory.
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10 Some economists like Subramaniam (2008) argue that the foundation of India’s high growth was laid down in 
the 1980s, and perhaps even earlier when it acquired a skilled workforce and industrial experience. However, 
Panagariya (2008) attributes India’s success entirely to the market-friendly reforms of the 1990s. 
 This 





growth phase started, it could not have been sustained without the major structural reforms 
undertaken by the Narasimha Rao government from 1991 to 1995. These reforms 
significantly increased India's openness to the global economy and reduced the level of 
government controls and licenses, which have clearly become dysfunctional (Purcell 2007, 
Panagariya 2008). By lowering policy-induced entry barriers, the reforms also greatly 
increased the level of competition in domestic markets and encouraged the import of new 
and much needed technology. The growing openness, increasing domestic competition, and 
greater space for private sector activity in the manufacturing and services sectors virtually 
redefined the macroeconomic fundamentals of the economy and put India on a new growth 
trajectory essentially by raising the rate of growth of its potential output. As Figure 5 and 6 
below show, after the reforms of the early 1990s, India was able to achieve much lower rates 
of inflation; significantly higher rates of domestic savings, which increased from 21% of GDP 
in FY2001–2002 to 33% in FY2007–2008; and consequently a higher level of investment as 
well. An improved domestic savings rate coupled with increased inflow of foreign capital, 
both in terms of FDI and ECBs, eased the domestic cost of capital,
11
If sustained, the reforms will help to raise India's rate of growth of potential output, and may 
even enable the country to catch up with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the 
coming decades. Figure 7 shows the average annual GDP growth rate achieved by India 
and the PRC in their post-reform periods. We take 1978 as the initial year for the PRC’s 
reforms and 1991 for India
 which declined in 
nominal terms from 19% in 1993 to 11.75% in 2006. These changes have been the 
fundamental basis for India’s having achieved a higher sustained GDP growth in the post-
reform period. 
12
Figure 5: Average Rate of Inflation 
. The trend growth rate achieved by India in its shorter post-
reform period is not very different from the PRC's. This holds out the hope that even 
following the rather distinctly domestic demand driven growth strategy, India could achieve a 
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Source: RBI (2009a). 
                                                 
 
11 Prime lending rate (maximum). 
12 1978 was the year when PRC started its process of liberalization. In the same way, India embarked on the path 
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Source: RBI (2009a). 
Figure 7: Post-Reform Growth Rates, People’s Republic of China (PRC) versus India 
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Sources: RBI (2009) and NBS (2008). 
Table 12: Sectoral Average Decadal Growth and Share 
  
  
1980s  1990s  2000s 
Growth  Share  Growth  Share  Growth  Share 
Agriculture   2.97  35.04  3.34  28.40  3.20  20.45 
Industry  6.41  18.66  6.63  20.09  7.24  19.43 
Services*  6.35  46.30  7.32  51.51  9.74  60.12 
Source: CSO (2009). 





The post-1991 high GDP growth has largely been attributed to the spectacular performance 
of the services sector, especially the software and IT-enabled services sector, in India.
13
This was also reflected in the services sector's success in attracting FDI (see Figure 8). The 
surge in FDI to services ensured a wholesale movement in technological upgrading. The 
surge in software and services growth, premised as it was on technological breakthroughs, 
was greatly facilitated by the major reforms in the telecommunications sector. Prior to the 
reforms of the 1990s, the telecom sector was a dysfunctional government monopoly, unable 
to satisfy the rising demand, as reflected in the country’s abnormally low tele-density level of 
0.8% in 1992. The sector was characterized by extensive rationing and the generation of 
rents and high tariffs. But with the economic reforms of the  1990s,  specifically due to 
privatization and the entry of foreign players, the communication sector became the fastest 
growing sector of the Indian economy. Since then, tele-density has increased to nearly 50%, 
and India has emerged as the fastest growing market for mobile phones, with new 
connections increasing at a phenomenal rate of more than 12 million per month. The sector 
also emerged as a major contributor to GDP growth, with its average contribution rising to 
12.2% in 2001–2008 (see Table 12). In a similar manner, other services sectors—such as 
the financial and non-financial sectors, which have received a large amount of FDI—have 
also contributed significantly to GDP growth. 
 The 
relative success of India’s services sector, at least prior to 1980, can be entirely attributed to 
its  education system, which until recently was biased towards secondary and higher 
education. The bias toward higher technical education proved fortuitous, as it provided India 
with a first-mover advantage in the US software market when it opened up in a big way 
during the mid-1990s and faced a huge manpower shortage as the US completed the 
transition of its IT-based equipment to the new century, which required a massive effort to 
rewrite existing software. 
The positive contribution of the services sector to India's GDP growth rate in the past two 
decades is unequivocal. The question is whether this rather imbalanced growth, which has 
seen the manufacturing and agriculture sectors lag behind significantly (as reflected in their 
stagnant and declining shares in the GDP), can help India achieve the necessary growth 
rate in employment and sustain its overall rate of economic activity. It is estimated that for all 
its burgeoning exports and rapid expansion, the software and information technology 
enabled services (ITES) sector have generated only 1.63 million employment opportunities 
(Illiyan 2008). This is clearly inadequate for a country with 65% of its population below the 
age of 25, and with a workforce that expands annually by more than 12 million people. A 
growth model that does not generate sufficient employment opportunities cannot be 
sustained. Evidently, India has to undertake a form of rebalancing of its growth strategy by 
making the sources of growth more broad-based so that more employment is generated and 
inequalities are not allowed to increase. India's democratic, diverse, and pluralistic society 
will not be able to sustain an imbalanced and jobless growth. To achieve the necessary 
balance, India needs to concentrate its policy attention on completing the next phase of 
structural reforms. These are briefly discussed in the next section. 
                                                 
 
13 Though the Indian services sector hogged the limelight after the economic reforms of 1980s and 1990s, its 
relative success can in fact be traced back to the pre-independence period. In an interesting  analysis, 
Broadberry (2008) compared the productivity gap between Britain and India for all three sectors—agriculture, 
industry, and services—and found it to be smaller in services than in industry or agriculture since the First 






























Source: Ministry of Commerce (2007–2009). 
* Financial and non-financial services. 
Table 12: Relative Contribution of Different Sectors to GDP Growth 
Sectors   Average Contribution to 
Growth (2001–08) 
Average Share in 
GDP (2001–08) 
Agriculture including Livestock  4.55  19.1 
Forestry and Logging   0.22  0.83 
Fishing   0.56  0.96 
Mining and Quarrying   1.65  2.17 
Registered Manufacturing  11.68  10.19 
Unregistered Manufacturing  4.6  4.93 
Electricity, Gas, and Water Supply   1.42  2.26 
Construction   9.12  6.45 
Trade   16.64  13.96 
Hotels and Restaurants  1.91  1.39 
Railways  1.17  1.19 
Transport by Other Means   6.48  5.07 
Storage  0.02  0.07 
Communication  12.24  3.6 
Banking and Insurance  8.11  6.12 
Real Estate, Ownership of Dwellings, 
and Business Services 
8.53  7.57 
Public Administration and Defense  2.82  5.98 
Other Services  8.25  8.21 
Total  100  100 





8.  RESTRUCTURING AND REFORMS FOR SUSTAINABLE 
GROWTH 
As discussed above, while India has so far managed to grow without a rapid expansion of its 
manufacturing sector, such growth is certainly not a viable option in long run. Given the vast 
pool of unskilled labor along with the inability of the services sector to generate adequate 
employment opportunities, a strong and dynamic manufacturing sector is a prerequisite for 
sustainable growth. The failure of the manufacturing sector in generating employment could 
exacerbate the growing economic inequalities, which is already causing considerable social 
stress. With wage rates beginning to rise in the PRC, India has fair chances of attracting 
foreign investment in labor-intensive industries. However, for this to happen, India urgently 
needs to initiate another round of structural reforms that will improve the investment climate; 
continue to improve its physical infrastructure as has been done over the past ten years; 
remove the impediments for the growth of small and medium enterprises (SMEs); expand 
enrollment in secondary, vocational, and higher education; and improve the quality of 
education at all levels. 
Being concentrated in labor-intensive and often in export-oriented industries, SMEs have 
faced the brunt of the collapse in external demand during the current crisis. SMEs presently 
suffer from having to face a plethora of official procedures and licensing and regulatory 
requirements that raise their transaction costs significantly, making them uncompetitive in 
global markets and unable to withstand import competition in domestic markets. The 
government will do well to review all the policies that have an impact on “doing business” in 
India with the clear objective of improving the investment climate, specifically for SMEs.
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The other major area for structural reforms is the education sector. The sector is presently 
characterized by massive capacity constraints, an acute shortage of adequately trained 
teachers, and poor curriculum quality. Investment is constrained due to extensive entry 




India  cannot possibly hope to compete effectively in the emerging global knowledge 
economy if the country’s education sector remains underdeveloped (see Dahlman and Utz 
2005). A comparison with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is instructive. India’s adult 
literacy is 61%,  compared with  the PRC’s 91%  (see World Bank 2008). Expenditure on 
education as a percentage of total public expenditure is 10.7% and 12.8%, respectively, in 
India and the PRC. The latter has 708 researchers per million people as compared to 119 in 
India. In 1985, the number of PhDs in science and engineering in India was 4,007 and just 
125 in the PRC; but by 2004, the PRC had 14,858 PhDs while India had increased the 
number to only 6,318. In 2007, Indians filed 35,000 patents compared to 245,161 patents by 
the Chinese. The PRC allocated 1.34% of its GDP in 2005 on R&D (which incidentally is well 
below 3.6% in Korea), compared to barely 0.61% in India. The country has only 12,000  
. Quality is confined to the top few institutions; in the remaining schools, curricula are 
outdated, pedagogical skills are deficient, facilities are poor, and there is a singular student 
focus on passing examinations. The sector needs policy attention as urgently as the industry 
and trade sectors did at the end of the 1980s. Without these reforms, India will miss the oft-
touted demographic dividend. Instead, the addition of ill-trained and unemployable entrants 
to the workforce every year could create the conditions for major social conflict and unrest. 
                                                 
 
14 The evidence for this would be best reflected in an improvement in India’s rankings in the World Bank’s “Doing 
Business” surveys this coming year. 





vocational training institutes compared to nearly 500,000 in the PRC, which sends more than 
19% of its youth onto higher education. In India, on the other hand, just 11–12% of students 
attend colleges and universities (Guruswamy 2010). 
Reforms are long overdue. India must  ensure that education is accessible to all by 
multiplying the number of scholarships a  hundred-fold and,  more  importantly,  making 
commercial bank credit for all levels of education more readily available. In short, a social 
movement may be necessary to ensure that the right to education is actually achieved. If 
successful, India will be on a sustainable path of rapid growth.  Governance reforms, 
discussed above in the context of SMEs,  and  an  overhaul  of  the education sector are 
perhaps the two most critically needed structural reforms. The payback on them could well 
be even higher than those from industrial and tariff or telecom sector reforms. 
The agriculture sector, which employs up to 50% of the working population but contributes 
less than a fifth of the GDP, is lagging behind the rest of the economy. There is a growing 
gap between rising per capita incomes and per capita availability of food grains (Kumar et al. 
2010). This could make inflation sticky and make macroeconomic stability more difficult to 
achieve. Inadequate availability of wage goods (food and other essential commodities) could 
lower the potential growth rate as monetary policy will have to remain tight in the face of 
inflationary expectations. Inflation, being an insidious tax on the poor, is also a politically 
sensitive issue. Urgent attention is needed to address the structural constraints that currently 
afflict Indian agriculture. In short, the agriculture sector needs to be modernized with the 
infusion of new technologies, modern cultivation practices, and more efficient logistics chains 
to move food from the farm gate to consumers with minimal waste and higher incomes for 
the farmers. This can only happen if private capital is attracted to agriculture and brings in 
new technology for raising yields. This calls for new approach to the agriculture sector that 
will  make it far less dependent on government subsidies, support prices,  and  other 
government interventions, which are currently pervasive in the sector. Government policy 
may be directed toward creating a set of incentives for attracting private investment to the 
sector both in production and  logistics. The experience of contract  farming, which is 
essentially an attempt to overcome the fragmented nature of agriculture holdings, should be 
reviewed, and lacunae identified and addressed. The modernization of retail trade, with its 
extensive backward linkages to agriculture, should also be considered for giving farmers a 
higher return and as an instrument for the introduction of new technologies and infrastructure 
in agriculture. 
The other major area for reform lies in the delivery of public services, starting with law and 
order and including primary health, urban facilities, and better connectivity in the rural sector. 
This would essentially depend on the success in undertaking governance reforms and 
making public administration more accountable. India’s Right to Information Act, enacted in 
2005, could play an important role in improving accountability, as it will allow the potential 
beneficiaries to follow the trail of public expenditure and ensure its efficient utilization. 
Accountability would also be increased by empowering local rural and urban governments, 
as is being attempted under the provisions of the Panchayti Raj (Local Rural Government) 
bill that is now 18 years old. A further impetus for public sector accountability could come 
from moving to a well designed performance-based or outcome-based budgetary process
16
                                                 
 
16 A start was made in this direction by Finance Minister Chidambaram, who mandated the establishment of 
certain performance criteria for all the line ministries of the government, and compiling this together in an 
“outcome budget.” However, the outcomes themselves were simply the targets the ministries wanted to 
achieve, and there was no attempt to monitor or audit the progress towards achieving these targets and relate 
budgetary allocation to them. Rather than build upon this admittedly modest stratum, unfortunately, the 
process has since been abandoned. 
 
and the creation of a unified, all-India economic space by implementing the Generalised 
Services and Goods Tax (GST) as recommended by the Kelkar Task Force and more 





generating higher demand and allowing for an easier flow of capital and labor across the 
country—in turn reducing transaction costs and encouraging a more rational allocation of 
investment. This set of “second-generation” reforms is necessary for India to achieve the 
necessary rebalancing of its economic activity so that it can achieve not only a rapid but also 
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